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Abstract
Cambodia’s healthcare system has seen significant improvements in the last two decades. Despite
this, access to quality care remains problematic, particularly for poor rural Cambodians. The gov-
ernment has committed to universal health coverage (UHC) and is reforming the health financing
system to align with this goal. The extent to which the reforms have impacted the poor is not al-
ways clear. Using a system-wide approach, this study assesses how benefits from healthcare
spending are distributed across socioeconomic groups in Cambodia. Benefit incidence analysis
was employed to assess the distribution of benefits from health spending. Primary data on the use
of health services and the costs associated with it were collected through a nationally representa-
tive cross-sectional survey of 5000 households. Secondary data from the 2012–14 Cambodia
National Health Accounts and other official documents were used to estimate the unit costs of serv-
ices. The results indicate that benefits from health spending at the primary care level in the public
sector are distributed in favour of the poor, with about 32% of health centre benefits going to the
poorest population quintile. Public hospital outpatient benefits are quite evenly distributed across
all wealth quintiles, although the concentration index of 0.058 suggests a moderately pro-poor
distribution. Benefits for public hospital inpatient care are substantially pro-poor. The private sector
was significantly skewed towards the richest quintile. Relative to health need, the distribution of
total benefits in the public sector is pro-poor while the private sector is relatively pro-rich. Looking
across the entire health system, health financing in Cambodia appears to benefit the poor more
than the rich but a significant proportion of spending remains in the private sector which is largely
pro-rich. There is the need for some government regulation of the private sector if Cambodia is to
achieve its UHC goals.
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Introduction
Cambodia is a lower-middle income country with a population of
15.7 million and a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of
$1269 in 2016 (World Bank, 2018b). During the last 20 years,
Cambodia has witnessed significant economic development with an
average annual growth rate of about 7.7% which has seen the coun-
try transition from low- to middle-income status in 2016 (World
Bank, 2018a). Although most Cambodians are still economically
vulnerable, with 70% of the population living on less than $5.5 a
day, the proportion of people living below the national poverty line
has drastically reduced from 47.8% in 2007 to 13.5% in 2014
(World Bank, 2017). Gross domestic savings as a proportion of
GDP has increased from 6.6% in 2000 to 18% in 2015 (ADB,
2018; World Bank, 2018c).
Alongside this sustained economic growth, the health system of
Cambodia has also seen significant improvements in the last two dec-
ades. Health outcomes have improved substantially, with life expect-
ancy at birth rising from 58 years in 2000 to 68 in 2014, although
healthy life expectancy remains relatively low at 58.9 years (UNDP,
2016). Other health indicators, including maternal and infant mor-
tality, have markedly improved. For example, maternal mortality has
declined from 472 per 100 000 live births in 2005 to 161 per
100 000 in 2015 (National Institute of Statistics et al., 2015; UNDP,
2016). Childhood immunization coverage has expanded with 81%
of children aged 12–23 months immunized against measles in 2016
compared with 52% in 2002. This has contributed to a steep decline
in infant and under-5 mortality rates, dropping from 45 and 54 per
1000 live births in 2010 to 27 and 35 per 1000, respectively, in 2014
(National Institute of Statistics et al., 2015).
Despite these achievements, health outcomes in Cambodia still
rank among the poorest in the Southeast Asian region. For example,
the 2015 maternal mortality rate (161 per 100 000 live births), com-
pares poorly with rates in neighbouring Thailand (20 per 100 000
live births) and Vietnam (55 per 100 000 live births; UNDP, 2016).
Malnutrition remains a challenge with about 32% of children under
5 (about 500 000 children) stunted and 9% severely stunted
(National Institute of Statistics et al., 2015). The country’s rate of
immunization against measles—around 81% of children aged 12–
23 months in 2016—lags behind those of Myanmar (91%), Vietnam
(99%) and Thailand (99%; World Bank, 2018b). Additionally, like
many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), Cambodia faces
a double burden of infectious and non-communicable diseases.
While malaria, tuberculosis and HIV infections are still widespread,
the growing burden of diabetes, hypertension and hypercholesterol-
aemia in the adult population is putting strain on the health system
(Chhoun et al., 2017).
Underlying these unfavourable indicators is the problem of lim-
ited and unequal access to quality healthcare and a dominant
unregulated private health sector. Many Cambodians, particularly
the poor and those living in rural areas, do not have access to qual-
ity health services despite past efforts and progress made in
expanding access (Liverani et al., 2017). For example, while nearly
96% of deliveries in the urban Phnom Penh province occur in
health facilities (public and private), only about 46% of deliveries
in the rural Kratie province occur in health facilities. Around 53%
of deliveries in the Kratie province occur at home and are attended
largely by unskilled birth attendants (National Institute of
Statistics et al., 2015).
Cambodia, like many LMICs, has committed to universal health
coverage (UHC) and is implementing reforms to expand access to
quality services while maintaining the gains made across the health
system over the past years (Wiseman et al., 2017). UHC requires
nations to ensure that all citizens have access to the health services
they need without the risk of financial hardship (Kutzin, 2013). An
essential component of UHC is removing financial barriers to
accessing health services and ensuring that people are not impover-
ished as a result of using healthcare. UHC-focused reform typically
incorporates strategies to boost overall funding for the health sys-
tem, increase the proportion of resources channelled through pooled
funding such as publicly funded insurance schemes, diverting spend-
ing to services known to be effective, and ensuring equitable finan-
cial access (Kutzin, 2013; Ensor et al., 2017).
Over the last decades Cambodia has implemented key health
financing reforms designed to promote equity in access to effective
and affordable healthcare, especially for the poor. Central among
these is the country’s Health Equity Funds (HEFs), a third-party
payer mechanism designed to remove financial barriers to accessing
public health facilities through reimbursement of fees to facilities for
health services rendered to the poor (Jacobs et al., 2007; Ensor
et al., 2017; Wiseman et al., 2017). This payer mechanism (the
HEF) applies only to the public sector, which comprises 40% of
health spending (government plus donor). Currently, there are no
social health insurance mechanisms for the private sector. The HEF
currently covers around 3.2 million Cambodians (about 20% of the
population; Ministry of Health, 2016a). Other financing reforms
and programmes include internal contracting of health services
(Vong et al., 2018), a government midwifery incentive scheme
designed to boost facility deliveries (Ir et al., 2015) together with the
now redundant voluntary health insurance schemes targeting the in-
formal sector (Annear et al., 2011) and a range of voucher schemes
intended to increase the uptake of reproductive and safe mother-
hood services by poor rural communities (Ensor et al., 2017;
Wiseman et al., 2017).
Evaluations of the HEF have produced mixed results with some
studies suggesting improvements in access to health services by the
poor while others showing no such effect. For e.g. Noirhomme
Key Messages
• Cambodia has committed to universal health coverage (UHC) and is reforming its health financing system to align with
this goal. Policymakers need comprehensive evidence on who benefits from the existing health financing arrangements
in order to streamline current reforms and forge a better path towards UHC.
• Benefits from health spending in the public sector are generally distributed in favour of the poor and the distribution
reflects the need for health services. Private sector benefits, especially private clinics/pharmacies and private hospital
outpatient departments, are substantially pro-rich.
• Cambodia has taken significant strides towards UHC but key challenges remain in ensuring that health spending deliv-
ers benefits to all Cambodians in accordance with their need for healthcare.
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et al., (2007) found that HEF enhanced access to hospital services
for the poor. Dingle and Powell-Jackson reported that exposure to
HEF was associated with a 4% increase in the probability of
receiving free care at any health provider but no association be-
tween HEF and utilization of health services was found (Dingle
and Powell-Jackson, 2016). Flores and associates found that while
HEF reduces the probability of resorting to the private sector, it
has no significant effect on the use of public care (Flores et al.
2013). The 2014 Demographic and Health Survey found that only
3.9% of men and 4.0% of women had their health services paid
for by a HEF (National Institute of Statistics et al., 2015). While
these insights are useful, they do not offer conclusive evidence on
the impact of the HEF and very little is known about the effects of
other interventions beyond the HEF as no comprehensive evalu-
ation of the equity of the health financing system in totality has
been undertaken. Policymakers need comprehensive evidence on
who benefits from the existing health financing arrangements in
order to streamline current reforms and forge a better path to-
wards UHC. This article assesses how the benefits from health
spending are shared across different socioeconomic groups in
Cambodia.
Materials and methods
We employed benefit incidence analysis (BIA)—one of the standard
measures of equity in health financing—to assess the distribution of
healthcare benefits across different wealth quintiles. BIA is an ana-
lytical technique for measuring the extent to which different socioe-
conomic groups benefit from public spending for health through
their use of health services (O’Donnell et al., 2008; McIntyre and
Box 1. Overview of the health financing system
Cambodia spends around 6% of its GDP on health, which is slightly higher than the 4.6% average spent by countries in the
Southeast Asian region in 2015 (World Bank, 2018b; WHO, 2018). Total health expenditure (THE) was estimated at about
US$1 billion in 2014, translating to around US$68 per capita. There are three main sources of financing for the health sys-
tem—out-of-pocket (OOP), government and donor payments. OOP spending is by far the largest source of funding for the
health system, constituting around 60% of THE. In per capita terms, every Cambodian contributed around US$43 in OOP
health spending in 2014. However, high OOP payments are not unique to Cambodia. Many countries in the region derive
more than 50% of their the from direct OOP spending (OECD/WHO, 2016). Government funding constitutes about 20% of
THE and compares poorly with the 36.1% average spent by governments across lower-middle income countries (World
Bank, 2018b). Donor funding accounts for the remaining 20%.
In terms of composition, Cambodia’s OOP spending is largely made up of spending for private sector services at phar-
macies and clinics. In the public sector, official user fees raise funds principally to support operational costs at government
hospitals and health centres, though they comprise only a small proportion of government revenue. User fees were intro-
duced as part of health sector reforms initiated in 1996 with the objective of raising additional revenue to improve quality
of services and increase staff motivation (Jacobs et al., 2018; Ministry of Health, 2015a). To lessen the negative effects of
user fees for government health services, Cambodia introduced the HEF to offer some degree of financial risk protection to
the poor and to stimulate the use of public health services. Beneficiaries of the HEF are identified either through the nation-
al Identification of Poor Households Program (IDPoor) carried out by the Ministry of Planning or through post-identification,
which is used at referral hospitals to identify poor patients who have not been pre-identified (Annear et al., 2016). The HEF
has expanded over time and reviews suggest, on average, beneficiary households have reduced their OOP spending on
health care and seek care less frequently in the private sector (Flores et al., 2013). Despite this, the overreliance on direct
payment to finance healthcare in Cambodia still poses a significant challenge to the country’s desire to move towards UHC
as there is some evidence that a substantial proportion of HEF beneficiaries still initiate healthcare seeking at private health
providers where they incur considerable OOP expenses (Jacobs et al., 2018).
Government health expenditure in Cambodia constituted about 6.1% of general government expenditure in 2015, which
was below the 8.5% regional average for Southeast Asia (WHO, 2018; World Bank, 2018b). The government allocates its
funding for health largely as a regular annual budget for health activities via Ministry of Health (MOH) and other health
institutions. However, it also allocates funds to co-finance the country’s pooled funding arrangements with selected donors
under the Health Equity and Quality Improvement Program (H-EQIP; Ministry of Health, 2018). In terms of levels of expend-
iture, about 30% of the 2014 government health budget was allocated to provincial levels while the rest was managed at
the central MOH level (Ministry of Health, 2015a).
The health system of Cambodia relies heavily on donor (external) funding. In 2015, the average external health ex-
penditure per capita for lower-middle income countries was US$2.6 but in Cambodia it was US$13.3—about 512%
higher, and a rise of more than 831% from US$1.6 in 2000 (World Bank, 2018b). Donor health spending has also seen a
small reduction. Data from 5-year Cambodia National Health Account 2012–16 indicate that general government health
expenditure as a proportion of THE averaged 21% over the 5-year period; donor funding for the same period averaged
18%, while OOP spending averaged 61%. Traditionally, donor funding for health has been allocated largely as earmarked
funds for disease-specific national programmes such as malaria control or the HIV/AIDS programme. However, under the
H-EQIP, donors in Cambodia contribute 40% of finances required to fund the HEF while the government fund the remain-
ing 60% (Annear et al., 2016). With the continuing growth of Cambodia’s economy and maturation to middle-income sta-
tus, it is expected that many donors will reduce or withdraw their health sector funding support. Global health initiatives,
such as the Global Fund or GAVI, the vaccine alliance, have already requested increased government co-financing
(Cantelmo et al., 2018).
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Ataguba, 2011; Wagstaff, 2012). A combination of primary and sec-
ondary data was used in this analysis.
The primary data were gathered through a nationally representa-
tive cross-sectional household survey involving 5000 randomly
selected households across Cambodia and nearly 25 000 individuals.
The survey was conducted between November 2015 and February
2016 and consisted of a sample of 1000 urban and 4000 rural
households. Full details of the sampling procedure are published
elsewhere (see Wiseman et al., 2017; http://gh.bmj.com/content/2/1/
e000153). The household survey gathered information on utilization
of various types of health services including selected preventive
healthcare services (family planning services, antenatal care, vaccin-
ation services, etc.), the costs incurred for using these services, and
household living standard data to enable the ranking of households
by their socioeconomic status. The survey also included questions
on self-assessed health status for the purpose of assessing the health
needs of households’ members. We used a standard recall period of
1 month for utilization of outpatient care and 12 months for in-
patient and preventive care (WHO, 2011).
The secondary data were extracted from three main sources: the
National Health Accounts 2014, Demographic and Health Survey
2014 and Annual Health Statistics Report 2012 (National Institute
of Statistics et al., 2015; Ministry of Health and WHO, 2012;
Ministry of Health, 2015b). We extracted data on THE for various
types of facilities (health centres, public hospital outpatient, private
pharmacies, private hospital/clinics and private hospital inpatient
care) from the National Health Accounts. This was matched with
health service utilization data estimated from the Annual Health
Statistics Report and the Demographic and Health Survey to com-
pute the unit costs of outpatient and inpatient services in public and
private facilities. We used data from the Demographic Health
Survey to estimate utilization of private outpatient care (pharmacies
and clinics) as the Annual Health Statistics of the Ministry of Health
had no data on the use of private facilities.
The estimation of unit cost was based on the constant unit cost
assumption, where each type of care (e.g. each hospital outpatient
visit) is assumed to cost the same, and equal to total costs incurred
in providing the type of service (i.e. subsidies plus user fees) divided
by the number of units of utilization (World Bank, 2012a). To esti-
mate the unit cost for each sub-type of service, we divided the total
expenditure for that type by total utilization. We obtained disaggre-
gated data for both public and private hospital outpatient and in-
patient care from the relevant official who was involved in the
compilation of the 2014 National Health Accounts report. The
same unit costs for public hospital outpatient and inpatient care
were applied to all hospitals regardless of the type of hospital. We
adjusted the utilization data for public hospital outpatient and in-
patient care obtained from the 2012 Annual Health Statistics Report
to bring them to 2014 levels to match the 2014 expenditure data
from the National Health Accounts.
The private hospital inpatient care was divided into private-for-
profit and private-not-for-profit facilities. There was information on
total expenditure for private-for-profit inpatient care but no utiliza-
tion data could be found. We therefore estimated utilization of pri-
vate inpatient care based on hospitalization in public facilities. In
2012, there was a total of 653 434 inpatient discharges and 6579
deaths, giving a total of 45 discharges per 1000 persons and a mor-
tality rate of 4 per 10 000 persons. This information was used to es-
timate total admissions per year for public inpatient departments
and a ratio of one admission in the public sector to 0.5 inpatient ad-
mission in the private sector was applied (Ministry of Health and
WHO, 2012). We triangulated the estimated hospitalization data
with the actual private-for-profit hospital utilization information
from our household survey. The estimated use was higher than the
actual data by a factor of 1:1.57 but overall rate of utilization (both
actual and estimated) was low compared with private outpatient
use.
In the analysis, we sought to ascertain whether the distribution
of benefits from healthcare spending for a given facility was pro-
poor or pro-rich and was in line with the need for healthcare. We
constructed an asset index to proxy socioeconomic status using the
household living standard variables in principal component analysis
(Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006; O’Donnell et al., 2008). Data for
outpatient visits were annualized to obtain visits per year. Self-
assessed health status by households was used as a proxy of health
need (Manderbacka, 1998). Respondents in the survey were asked
to rate the health status of each member of their households on three
response categories: ‘good’ (rarely gets ill), ‘fair’ (occasionally gets
ill) and ‘bad’ (chronically and/or frequently ill). We followed the ap-
proach used by earlier studies in LMICs (Ataguba and McIntyre,
2012b; Chuma et al., 2012) and classified individuals into two
groups of need: good health (suggesting no need for care) if the
health status of a household member is assessed as ‘good’ and poor
health (suggesting need for care) if health status is assessed to be
‘fair’ or ‘bad’. To determine the amount of benefit we multiplied the
unit cost per service for a given facility by the rate of usage and
deducted any OOP cost incurred by the user (Asante et al., 2014). A
concentration index (CI) was generated and used to measure the
pro-poorness of the distribution of benefit. The CI ranges from 1.0
to þ1.0 and captures the degree to which health payments are dis-
tributed among the economically worse off as compared with the
better off (O’Donnell et al., 2008). We also presented the results
using concentration curves.
Results
Healthcare needs and treatment seeking behaviours
Close to 36% of the study population reported being injured or sick
in the last month before the survey (Table 1). Those who have visited
a health facility in the past month (n¼8587 or 96.5% of those who
reported injured or sick) were slightly lower than those who reported
being injured or sick ahead of the survey. Some of these individuals
may have visited a health facility for preventive purposes and not ne-
cessarily because they were sick. The overall rate of utilization of pre-
ventive healthcare (about 10.7% of individuals) appears low but
given the narrow definition of preventive care in this study, covering
only preventive maternal and child healthcare, this may not be as low
as it seems. Besides, the use of preventive services such as family plan-
ning is very personal, and hence, the respondent of the household sur-
vey may not have a full knowledge of users of such services in the
household. A small number of people (n¼221 or 0.9% of individu-
als) reported not seeking care when they were unwell and then the
sickness got worse. Most of these people either thought their sickness
was not serious enough to seek treatment or could not afford the
costs associated with using health services.
Utilization of health services by socioeconomic group
The most commonly used health services and facility sub-type in
Cambodia are outpatient services in private pharmacies and private
hospitals/clinics. Of those who reported visiting any health facility
as an outpatient in the last month, nearly 55% visited these two
facilities. Around 14.3% visited health centres (Table 1). The distri-
bution of health service use in Cambodia, as illustrated by Figure 1,
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was relatively pro-poor for government health facilities and the op-
posite for private facilities. Health centres were mostly used by the
poorest population quintile, who accounted for nearly 33% of the
total health centre visits. The richest quintile accounted for just
about 4% of the total health centre visits. Similarly, public hospital
inpatient care was mostly used by the poor, with the bottom two
quintiles using nearly 60% of all public hospital inpatient services
(Figure 1). Overall, hospitalization in Cambodia, as in other LMICs,
was found to be low with 5.6% of individuals reporting being hospi-
talized in the 12 months preceding the survey (Table 1). A little over
half (53%) of all hospital admissions occurred in public hospitals.
The use of outpatient departments (OPDs) in public hospitals was
fairly evenly distributed across all wealth quintiles suggesting that
Cambodians of all socioeconomic standing use public hospital
OPDs, although the richest quintile use these services slightly more
than the poorest quintile.
The distribution of the use of private health facilities was pro-
rich, especially in the case of private hospital/clinics and private
pharmacies services. The richest quintile accounted for about
30% of all private hospital outpatient visits compared with only
13% of the bottom quintile using these services. A similar utiliza-
tion pattern was observed for private pharmacy services, where
the top quintile accounted for around 26% of visits compared
Table 2. Unit cost of health service by type of facility (US$)
Public facilities USD
Health centre 2.87
Hospital OP 35.16
Hospital IP 195.90
Private facilities
Private pharmacies 4.86
Private hospital/clinics OP 16.16
Private-not-for-profit hospital IP 17.45
Private-for-profit hospital IP 162.74
Data sources: National Health Accounts 2014; Annual Health Statistics
2012. Demographic and Health Survey 2014.
OP, outpatient; IP, inpatient.
Table 1. Selected descriptive statistics from household survey
Data label Number (%)
Number of households surveyed
Rural Cambodia 3934 (78.6)
Urban Cambodia 1073 (21.4)
Total number of persons
Male 11 769 (47.6)
Femalea 12 908 (52.2)
Persons reportedly injured or sick in the last month 8913 (36.0)
Persons who visited any health facility in the last month as an outpatient 8587 (96.5)
Those who visited a health centre in the last month 1228 (14.3)
Those who visited a public hospital in the last month 538 (6.3)
Those who visited private hospital/clinic in the last month 2099 (24.5)
Those who visited private pharmacy in the last month 2569 (30.0)
Persons hospitalized in the last 12 months 1307 (5.6)
Hospitalized in a public hospital 618 (47.3)
Hospitalized in a private-for-profit hospital 122 (9.3)
Hospitalized in a private-not-for-profit hospital 562 (43.0)
Persons seeking preventive care in the last 12 months 2346 (10.7)
Persons not seeking care when sick in the last 12 months and the sickness got worse 221 (0.9)
a73 (0.3%) undetermined. Use of outpatient care had a recall period of 1 month while hospitalization and use of preventive care had a 12-month recall period.
Figure 1 Utilization of health services by wealth quintile and facility type. Data source: Household survey conducted for this study. FP, for-profit; NFP, not-for-
profit; OPD, outpatient department; IPD, inpatient department.
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with 16% for the bottom quintile. Hospital admissions in the pri-
vate sector were relatively evenly distributed, especially when
compared with private outpatient visits—private hospital/clinics
and private pharmacies. However, hospitalization in private-for-
profit hospitals was neither pro-poor nor pro-rich; it appears
both the richest and poorest quintile avoid the use of these facili-
ties. Many of the hospitalizations in the private sector occurred
in non-profit facilities which, in this study, accounted for 38.4%
of all hospital admissions.
Unit cost of service by facility type (in US$)
We obtained the unit cost of each type of service by dividing the total
costs incurred in providing the service over a period of 1year by the
total number of units of utilization of that service (see page 4 for sources
Table 3. Distribution of THE and healthcare benefits by facility type
Type of facility Share of THE 2014
(million USD)
Percentage
shares
Share of healthcare benefit (%) CI
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Health centre 60.2 5.8 31.0 21.9 20.1 24.9 2.2 0.280
Public hospital OPD 303.0 29.4 21.0 23.1 19.6 17.5 18.8 0.058
Public hospital IPD 161.0 15.6 33.6 26.2 21.7 7.0 11.6 0.276
Total—public sector 524.3 50.9 24.6 25.0 20.4 15.9 14.1 0.614
Private pharmacy 140.4 13.6 14.3 17.2 17.7 24.2 26.6 0.076
Private hospital/clinic OPD 343.1 33.3 10.4 11.1 16.5 33.3 28.7 0.204
Private-for-profit hospital IPD 21.5 2.1 13.6 21.8 21.6 31.4 11.5 0.038
Total—private sector (excl. non-profit) 504.9 49.0 11.7 14.4 16.7 32.7 24.5 0.242
Private NFP hospital IPD 0.7 0.1 87.0 2.6 1.7 3.8 5.0 0.529
Total—all sector 1.030 100.0 18.3 19.8 18.6 24.2 19.2 0.901
Data sources: THE data from the National Health Accounts 2014. Data on health care benefits are derived from a household survey conducted for this study.
Recall period for outpatient visits was 1 month while that of inpatient care was 12 months.
Figure 2. Distribution of healthcare benefits by facility and wealth quintile (concentration curve). Data sources: These graphs were constructed with data from the
household survey conducted for this study. Unit costs data were extracted from three main secondary sources: National Health Accounts 2014; Demographic
and Health Survey 2014; Annual Health Statistics Report 2012. CI, concentration index; SE, standard error; OPD, outpatient department; IPD, inpatient
department.
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of data used to compute unit costs). The unit costs of service for health
centres was around US$2.87 and about $2.00 lower than the unit cost
of service in private pharmacies (US$4.86; Table 2). The unit cost re-
sult for health centres is consistent with what was reported in a recent
costing study in Cambodia which determined the cost per health centre
visit to be US$3.24 (Flessa et al., 2018). However, the public hospital
OPD unit cost of US$35.16 was higher than the US$5.87 and US$9.65
Flessa and colleagues reported for a Complementary Package of
Activities (CPA) 1 and CPA 2 hospitals but lower than the US$41.53
they reported for CPA 3 hospitals. The unit cost for inpatient care in the
public sector was US$195.90 compared with the $162.74 in the pri-
vate-for-profit sector. The difference might be due to the gaps in data
for utilization of private hospitals; the Ministry of Health had no data
for utilization of private hospitals, so utilization was estimated based on
utilization of public hospitals. The unit cost for private-not-for-profit
hospitals ($17.45) appears low. While these are mainly NGO facilities
that often provide services at low cost (Alam and Ahmed, 2010), the
low unit cost here may have resulted from gaps in the expenditure and
utilization data used.
Distribution of healthcare benefits
The share of healthcare benefits received by different wealth quintiles as
presented in Table 3 indicates a relatively pro-poor distribution in pub-
lic sector facilities and a pro-rich distribution in private facilities, if pri-
vate-not-for-profit facilities are excluded. Health centres and public
hospital inpatient benefits were the most pro-poor with the poorest
quintile accounting for 31.0% and 33.6% of benefits, respectively, com-
pared with the 2.2% and 11.6% of these benefits going to the richest
quintile of the population. The fairly high concentration index (CI) of -
0.280 for health centre and -0.276 for public hospital inpatient facilities
confirm the pro-poorness of the distribution. In the case of health
centres, there was almost no difference between the share of health care
benefits to the poor quintile (31.0%) and their share of utilization
(33%). The benefit incidence for public hospital OPDs was marginally
pro-poor with a CI¼ -0.058 although the two poorest quintiles received
benefits slightly in excess of their population shares.
The distribution of healthcare benefits in the private sector fav-
oured the rich despite private hospital inpatient care being pro-poor.
Outpatient care in private hospitals/clinics, which accounted for
33.3% of benefits had a strong pro-rich distribution with the richest
quintile of the population capturing nearly 29% of benefits com-
pared with only 10.4% for the poorest quintile. The concentration
curve for private hospital/clinics lies considerably below the line of
equality (Figure 2). A similar pattern of pro-rich distribution of ben-
efits was observed in private pharmacies with the richest quintile
accounting for 27% of benefits compared with 14.3% for the poor-
est quintile. Benefit incidence for private inpatient care was surpris-
ingly pro-poor, especially in the non-profit sector where the poorest
quintile received almost all the benefits—more than four times their
population share (87.0%) and a high negative CI of -0.529. The
concentration curve for this facility lies well above the line of equal-
ity (Figure 2). However, inpatient care in the non-profit sector in
Cambodia accounted for <1% of total health spending and a small
number of admissions per year. The private-for-profit sector also
had a pro-poor distribution of benefits with a negative CI of -0.038.
Looking across the entire health system, health financing in
Cambodia appears to benefit the poor more than the rich but a sig-
nificant proportion of spending remains in the private sector which
is largely pro-rich. The high overall negative CI of—0.901 should be
interpreted with great caution—this was driven mainly by a high
negative CI for the non-profit hospital sector which accounted for
<1% of total spending and by the very pro-poor public sector distri-
bution of benefits. It does not mean the poor in Cambodia are pro-
tected against OOP payments for health.
Distribution of healthcare benefits relative to need
Overall, there were only limited variations in self-assessed need
across the wealth quintiles, although the level of need appears to
increase with socioeconomic status (Figure 3). The poorest quin-
tile of the population reported the highest proportion of health
need, 24.4% compared with 15.3% for the richest quintile. The
distribution of total healthcare benefits in the public sector was
largely in line with the need for healthcare. For example, the
poorest quintile with 24.4% of need received 24.6% of health-
care benefits while the richest quintile with 15.3% of need
accounted for 14.1% of benefits. The distribution of benefits in
the private sector was the direct opposite of the distribution in
the public sector—the richest quintile with less self-assessed need
captured the largest proportion of benefit—24.5%—which was
significantly higher than their share of need. Of note, the two
richest quintiles together accounted for nearly 60% of the total
private sector benefits. In contrast, the poorest quintile received a
relatively lower share of total private sector benefits (11.7%) des-
pite having the highest level of need.
Q1- Poorest Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5- Richest
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
Total public sector benefits Need for health care Total private sector benefits
Figure 3. Distribution of benefits and need for healthcare.
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Discussion
The results presented above show that benefits from health spending in
the public sector in Cambodia are generally distributed in favour of the
poor and the distribution reflects the need for health services. The distri-
bution of benefits was mostly pro-poor at the health centre level which
is consistent with findings reported elsewhere in other LMICs. For ex-
ample, Asante et al. (2017) found a pro-poor distribution of benefits
across health centres in Fiji. BIA studies undertaken in Southeast Asian
countries such as Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam have all reported a
pro-poor distribution of PHC benefits (Yu et al., 2008; Limwattananon
et al., 2012; World Bank, 2012b). While such distribution is critical for
UHC, the limited funding often allocated for service delivery at the
health centre level can affect service quality and undermine the overall
effort to improve health outcomes under UHC. Over 80% of THE in
Cambodia, as observed in this study, is expended on secondary and ter-
tiary care, leaving just around 20% of expenditure for PHC services
(public and private). Increasing funding for PHC services will not only
improve coverage but also has the potential to quality of services deliv-
ered and attract more patients to use these services (Shaw et al., 2015).
At the hospital level, the marginally pro-poor distribution of out-
patient benefits in the public sector (CI ¼ -0.058) is consistent with
what has been reported in other settings including neighbouring
Thailand (Limwattananon et al. 2012) and Fiji (Asante et al. 2017).
However, in many other countries, including Kenya (Chuma et al.
2012) and Mongolia (World Bank 2012c), public sector outpatient ben-
efits have been pro-rich. In their systematic review of equity in health-
care financing in LMICs, Asante et al., (2016) found 12 studies from
the Asia-Pacific region that reported a pro-rich distribution of benefits
for hospital OPDs. The pro-poor distribution in Cambodia may have
been facilitated by the country’s HEF, which has ensured some access
to hospital care for the poor. Indeed, a recent study by Annear and col-
leagues (2016) found that >20% of services at referral hospitals and
health centres are supported by the HEF, and based on this, the authors
concluded that HEF members (the poor) have greater access to hospi-
tals and health centres relative to their population size.
The distribution of inpatient care benefits in Cambodia is inconsist-
ent with global trends. While the results of this study indicate a clear
pro-poor distribution of benefits for public sector inpatient care, such
benefits have been distributed in favour of the rich in many LMICs. For
example, in Ecuador, Angeles and associates (2007) found the distribu-
tion of inpatient care to be pro-rich enough to neutralize the pro-poor
distribution of PHC benefits and brought the overall distribution down
to proportional. Pro-rich distribution of inpatient care has also been
reported in Ghana (Akazili et al., 2012; Mills et al., 2012), India
(Chakraborty et al., 2013) and Indonesia (O’Donnell et al., 2007). The
Cambodia result gives some indication that access to hospital services
for the poor may be improving.
Improved access to hospital services for the poor is vital for verti-
cal equity and needs to be further strengthened. Jacobs et al. (2018)
have observed that even with the improved access, the use of public
sector health services by poor Cambodians who are eligible for HEF
is still low, suggesting the system could be made even more pro-poor
if it were able to attract more current HEF beneficiaries. However, it
is important to ensure that the hospital referral system functions at
the optimum level to avoid referral of cases that can be handled at
the health centre level. Inappropriate referrals can encourage HEF
members to bypass health centres as they become used to free treat-
ment at the hospital level. Strengthening the PHC system, including
the quality of services will also help reduce unnecessary referrals.
The distribution of total benefits for private health facilities
(excluding non-profit facilities) was overall pro-rich and driven
largely by a relatively strong pro-rich distribution of outpatient
benefits (private pharmacies and private hospital/clinics). These
findings confirm what has been reported in several countries includ-
ing Kenya, Ghana and Tanzania (Chuma et al., 2012; Mills et al.,
2012; Mtei et al., 2012). In Southeast Asia, Limwattananon and
colleagues (2011) also reported pro-rich distribution of outpatient
benefits in private facilities in Thailand. The pro-rich distribution
in the private sector per se is not a bad thing—after all, if the rich
can pay to use private care, it may free up resources for a more
equitable and better quality care in the public sector. The challenge
for Cambodia, however, is that many poor people still pay OOP in
private facilities (National Institute of Statistics et al., 2015).
Outpatient services in private pharmacies and private-for-profit
hospitals/clinics account for nearly 47% of benefits. Given the sec-
tor is highly unregulated and delivers services that are largely per-
ceived to be of low quality (Ministry of Health, 2018), this may
subject patients to unnecessary and expensive care which will push
more poor Cambodians further into poverty and undermine the
objectives of UHC. The public sector may come under further pres-
sure as it will end up caring for those who have been ‘mistreated’
by the private sector.
The benefit incidence for private hospital inpatient care was pro-
poor in this study, which is inconsistent with findings reported else-
where. In fact, the few BIA studies that have covered the private sec-
tor have rather found the distribution of benefits for inpatient care
to be pro-rich (Castro-Leal et al., 2000; Limwattananon et al.,
2011; Ataguba and McIntyre, 2012a; Mtei et al., 2012; Asante
et al., 2017). In the case of Cambodia, benefits were marginally pro-
poor for private-for-profit facilities (CI ¼ 0.038) but substantially
so for private-not-for-profit hospitals (CI ¼ 0.529). The not-for-
profit hospital distribution is consistent with what has been reported
elsewhere (Chuma et al., 2012). Not-for-profit providers play a crit-
ical role in the provision of healthcare for the poor. In Ghana, the
Christian Health Association of Ghana (CHAG)—a major group of
health services—account for an estimated 42% of total health serv-
ices in the country with about 41% of its operating budget coming
from the government of Ghana (Saleh, 2013). In Cambodia, there
were over 180 NGOs working in the health sector as of December
2015 (Ministry of Health, 2016b). This underscores the importance
of the non-profit provider sector. Given the pro-poor distribution of
benefits in this sector, it is one area the government may want to ex-
plore in terms of forming productive partnerships to boost the coun-
try’s efforts of moving towards UHC.
A key policy implication of these results is the need for some gov-
ernment regulation of the private health sector in Cambodia. As al-
ready indicated, the distribution of private healthcare benefits in
favour of the rich is not an issue. The issue rather is the large number
of Cambodians who initiate care in the private sector, where almost
everything is paid OOP. Nearly 55% of individuals in this study
who sought outpatient care in the last month did so in private phar-
macies and private hospitals/clinics. This may undermine
Cambodia’s effort to move towards UHC as sufficient financial pro-
tection cannot be guaranteed under such high initiation of care in
the private sector. Government regulation can help to limit the
amount of fees private providers charge and reduce the potential of
catastrophic healthcare payments. Government regulation can also
ensure that a certain minimum level of quality care is provided by
private facilities. Although this study did not attempt to measure
quality of care in the private sector, it has been recognised that low-
quality care can subject patients to unnecessary and expensive treat-
ment which may in turn push the poor further into poverty (McPake
and Hanson, 2016).
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Limitations
A key limitation of this analysis is our inability to account for quality
of healthcare in the BIA. The quality of health service consumed by
different socioeconomic groups may differ across facilities and geo-
graphic location. The poorest quintile might be using low-quality
health services compared with the richest quintile (Asch et al., 2006;
Sharma et al., 2017). Focusing on the rate of utilization and unit cost
of service to calculate benefit without considering variations in quality
might lead to the overestimation or underestimation of benefits across
different wealth quintiles. Another limitation is the estimation of unit
cost for private-not-for-profit hospitals. Unlike other types of facili-
ties, utilization data was not available for the calculation of unit costs.
Finally, there is scepticism about the use of subjective health
measures as a proxy of health need particularly where populations
are diverse and use different frames of reference for evaluation
(Cheung, 1999). Despite such concerns Self-Assessed Health (SAH)
has been shown to be a reliable indicator of general health and well-
being across a number of different settings (Idler and Benyamini,
1997; van Doorslaer and Gerdtham, 2003), and continues to be
widely used as a proxy of health need.
Conclusion
Cambodia has taken significant strides towards UHC but key chal-
lenges remain in ensuring that health spending delivers benefits to all
Cambodians in accordance with the need for healthcare. The results
of this study clearly demonstrate that the benefits from health spend-
ing in the public sector in Cambodia are generally distributed in fa-
vour of the poor and this distribution reflects the need for health
services. However, nearly 50% of THE remains in the private sector
which distributes healthcare benefits in favour of the rich. This is a
huge challenge that must be tackled if the UHC dream is to become a
reality. Given that public spending on health constitutes just around
20% of THE, there is an opportunity for the government to increase
its share of health spending and allocate funds strategically to achieve
value for money. This will include ensuring that funds are allocated
to improve quality of health services at all levels of the health system.
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